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TO EDUCATE OR TO MAKE A PROFIT:
COMPENSATING COLLEGE ATHLETES’ FAMILIES
FOR TRAVELLING EXPENSES
“The old model of amateurism doesn’t work. College has become a minor
league for the pros.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the founding of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA” or “Association”), the college sports fan base has become the largest in the sports industry, giving college athletes an
ever-increasing status and value in society.2 The NCAA athletics
fans base is also the wealthiest, most diverse, and therefore most
lucrative of all sports.3 Major sports networks attribute large portions of their revenues to college sports viewership.4 Prospective
college athletes from around the world aspire for the opportunity
to compete for American college sports teams, and NCAA Division I
teams recruit around 3,000 international athletes per year.5 What
continues to contribute to the success of college sports is the
NCAA’s focus on education as the priority motivating its policies.6
Part of this focus is the desire to “preserv[e] an academic environ1. Mark Koba, How College Athletes Could End Up Getting Paid Like Pros, CNBC
(Feb. 3, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100420450 (quoting Scott
Minto, Director of San Diego State University Sports MBA Program).
2. See The Largest, Most Attractive Fan Base in Sports, IMG COLLEGE, http://
www.imgcollege.com/why-college (last visited Apr. 14, 2016) (discussing the
“booming business” and continued rise of college sports); Glenn M. Wong, Christopher R. Deubert & Justin Hayek, NCAA Division I Athletic Directors: An Analysis of
the Responsibilities, Qualifications and Characteristics, 22 MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 2
(2015) (recognizing college sports as fostering high degree of loyalty and attachment that rivals professional sports).
3. See Wong et al., supra note 2, at 2 (distinguishing college sports from professional sports by audience’s appreciation and respect for higher education goals
and institution).
4. See id. at 24–25 (describing growth of viewership for cable networks broadcasting college sporting events and dramatic rise in momentum and gains for television networks).
5. See Erin Abbey-Pinegar, Note, The Need for a Global Amateurism Standard: International Student-Athlete Issues and Controversies, 17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 341,
342 (2010) (noting athletic and academic scholarship opportunities NCAA competition provides for international athletes).
6. See Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org./amateurism (last visited Apr.
14, 2016) (describing amateurism as NCAA’s method to achieve goal of education
and competition).
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ment.”7 The Association substantiates its regulation decisions on
providing quality education and equitable competition.8
Despite the Association’s restriction on compensation for college athletes, it recently granted a travel expenses waiver.9 The
waiver permits colleges to compensate families of student-athletes
to travel to Final Four and College Football Playoff games.10 The
waiver promises up to $3,000 in expenses for families travelling to
Final Four games and up to $4,000 for travel to the championship
game.11 It also grants member institutions the option to provide
additional benefit for these and other championships.12 When the
waiver was released, the NCAA’s vice president stated that in enacting the waiver, the NCAA was dedicated to including families in the
championship experience.13
This move by the NCAA raises issues concerning the apparent
paradigm shift indicated by the decision to compensate parents and
families while restrictions on player compensation remain so tightly
enforced.14 Indeed, until the waiver was announced, any money
given to an athlete’s family for travel to championship games would
have been penalized with ineligibility.15 The waiver brings the
7. Id. (listing NCAA’s emphasis on amateur status through strict requirements
limiting college athlete activity such as: receipt of salary, agent representation, and
receipt of rewards or prizes).
8. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA ELIGIBILITY CENTER QUICK
R EFERENCE G UIDE , available at http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/eligibility_center/
Quick_Reference_Sheet.pdf (setting forth pre-eligibility, qualifying, and academic
requirements allowing players to retain amateur status and comparisons to other
NCAA institutions).
9. See NCAA to Pay for Family Travel Under Pilot Program, NCAA (Jan. 6, 2015,
2:31 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/grantswaiver-college-football-playoff-national-championship (announcing NCAA’s travel
expense waiver). The waiver was announced January 6, 2015, and follows NCAA’s
past decisions to provide exclusive tickets and to host receptions for athletes’ families. See id.
10. See id. (describing NCAA’s promise to assist families with travel expenses
to out-of-town championship and playoff games).
11. See id. (describing benefits to be made available to families of athletes
competing in sufficiently elite competition tournaments or games).
12. See id. (describing NCAA’s permission to member institutions to provide
additional travel benefits when universities deem appropriate on more permanent
basis).
13. See id. (describing NCAA’s statement of waiver as progress in its current
goal to improve student-athlete experience).
14. See Andy Schwartz, Wait, the NCAA Can Pay Players’ Parents Now?, REGRESSING (Jan. 7, 2015, 10:41 AM), http://regressing.deadspin.com/wait-the-ncaacan-pay-players-parents-now-1677853402 (discussing travel expense waiver as contradictory to NCAA’s regulations and calling apparent restriction on athlete compensation into question in light of previous decisions).
15. See id. (illustrating contradictory nature of NCAA’s travel waiver announcement); see also NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2015–16 NCAA DIVISION
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NCAA one decision closer to student-athlete compensation.16 By
delegating funds to athletes’ families dependent on whether the
teams make it to the playoffs, the NCAA is creating a relationship,
however indirect, between performance and financial benefit
awarded to the players’ families.17 Fifty percent of college students
are financially supported by their parents, which means that when
the NCAA provides monetary benefits to an athlete’s family, the
athlete will likely benefit in some way as well.18 Regardless, the
NCAA continues to hold firm on its stance that paying college athletes for their athletic performance is counterintuitive to its mission
and purpose in regulating college sports.19
The amateurism goal is central to preserving the pro-competitive nature of the college sports industry.20 The Association claims
that it seeks to protect consumer demand by keeping student-athletes from receiving large sums of money for playing college
sports.21 It also claims that allowing compensation would interfere
with student-athletes’ education while hindering athletic integrity.22
I MANUAL, arts. 10.1, 12.3.1.3, (2015) [hereinafter 2015–16 NCAA MANUAL], available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D116JAN.pdf (setting forth NCAA bylaws).
16. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (finding NCAA’s purported commitment to
restricting athlete compensation inconsistent with travel waiver announcement).
17. See Ralph D. Russo, CFP, NCAA Will Reimburse Athletes’ Families for Travel,
YAHOO! SPORTS (Jan. 6, 2015, 10:08 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/cfp-ncaareimburse-athletes-families-travel-195435226—ncaaf.html (elaborating NCAA’s
payment scheme for travel compensation based on teams’ advancement).
18. See Quentin Fottrell, Half of College Graduates Expect to be Supported by Their
Families, MARKETWATCH.COM (May 23, 2015, 7:32 AM), http://www.marketwatch
.com/story/half-of-college-graduates-expect-to-be-supported-by-their-families-201505-19 (reporting statistics demonstrating financial support students receive from
their families during and after college).
19. See Stephen J. Kastenberg & Marcel S. Pratt, NCAA Cannot Bar Compensation of Student-Athletes for Use of Their Names and Likenesses, Federal Court Says, BALLARD
S PAHR (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/
legalalerts/2014-08-11-ncaa-cannot-bar-compensation-of-student.aspx (emphasizing NCAA’s determination to stand strong on its view that restricting compensation is pro-competitive); see also Amateurism, supra note 6 (detailing NCAA’s
emphasis on amateurism rules); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 7 F.
Supp. 3d 955, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (acknowledging validity of NCAA’s justifications for some compensation restrictions), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1167 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2016).
20. See Kastenberg & Pratt, supra note 19 (describing potential for studentathlete compensation as disrupting cooperation between member schools, both
athletically and academically).
21. See id. (explaining NCAA sanctions that exist to penalize schools for violating compensation rules to prevent schools from taking advantage of recruiting
inequalities).
22. See id. (stating NCAA’s position that athlete compensation would interfere
with education and integration of student-athletes in their academic
communities).
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The amateurism goal serves to prevent the commercial exploitation
of student-athletes.23
Concerns about the NCAA’s inconsistent stance when it comes
to player compensation are nothing new, and the waiver only exacerbates this issue.24 In an apparent attempt to quell criticism about
its stingy anti-compensation policies, the NCAA proudly announced
the waiver without specifying what enabled it to do so.25 Along with
the announcement, the Association proclaimed that it had been
discussing travel expenses compensation for the past few years.26
NCAA President Mike Emmert declared that the waiver has been
considered since 2011 and was the next step in “improving the student-athlete experience,” along with extended scholarship opportunities.27 Despite the NCAA’s proclaimed justifications, the travel
expense waiver exceeds the scope of the NCAA’s goal in restricting
compensation.28 The fallout from the waiver, therefore, has the potential to result in teams continuing to maneuver around the NCAA
restrictions and lead to numerous lawsuits filed by studentathletes.29
Courts have considered the student-athlete’s right to compensation using both the Sherman Antitrust Act,30 and the NCAA’s am23. See id. (describing NCAA’s concerns over negative impacts on consumer
perception and demand).
24. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (discussing negative public opinion about
NCAA’s justification for amateurism and anti-compensation policies). Although
the NCAA claims to hold firm on its policies, recent events have shown differently.
In January 2015, Ohio State University expressed outrage over the Association’s
refusal to assist families with travel, and two days later the NCAA announced that it
would allow Ohio State to grant these travel benefits for families’ travel to football
playoff games. See Jon Solomon, How Ohio State, Oregon Got NCAA Family Stipend
Passed in 2 Days, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 6, 2015, 1:44 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/
collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24939125/ohio-state-ad-expects-hurdles-onproposal-for-paid-playoff-family-travel (describing NCAA’s change in policy in response to complaints from member institutions about inconsistent enforcement of
sanctions).
25. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (noting lack of justification for travel waiver
backed by any significant provision in NCAA bylaws).
26. See NCAA to Pay for Family Travel Under Pilot Program, supra note 9 (quoting
NCAA Vice President’s statement of NCAA’s goals toward continuing progress in
family and travel accommodation).
27. See id. (quoting NCAA President, Mark Emmert’s explanation of travel
waiver development).
28. See Amateurism, supra note 6 (proclaiming strict anti-compensation policies
and eligibility requirements). The NCAA’s description of its amateurism goals
seems to leave no room for any fluctuation or modification to the platform. See id.
29. See generally In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
990 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (discussing student athletes’ demand for
compensation for use of name and likenesses).
30. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2004). For further discussion of
the Sherman Act and its application to NCAA regulation, see infra notes 96–107.
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ateurism standards.31 Historically, the NCAA had free rein in
enacting regulations in furtherance of amateurism.32 However, increasing challenges are beginning to erode the liberty it once enjoyed.33 Students have claimed that the NCAA restrained trade in
restricting licensing and use-of-likeness compensation in both the
college education and broadcasting markets.34 These restrictions
are based on the exclusive nature of the college sports market and
the explicit control the NCAA has over its revenue.35
Courts have also begun to approach the NCAA regulations
more harshly in light of its apparently wavering standards.36 The
market justification previously allowed has since been challenged
and sincerely questioned.37 Judicial history suggests that if the
NCAA does not more clearly establish the goals of its restrictions, it
may be subjected to numerous antitrust violations.38 Courts now
place a higher burden on the NCAA to produce evidence that its
regulation has pro-competitive effects.39 The variety of avenues
available to student-plaintiffs seeking compensation will be expanded by the introduction of the travel expenses waiver.40
31. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 331–37 (2007) (discussing NCAA
justifications); see also Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, No. 2:00-CV-1439, 2002 WL 32137511, at *14–15 (S.D. Ohio July 19,
2002) (analyzing student compensation under antitrust standard).
32. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 337 (describing courts’ general deference
toward NCAA policies and purported goals on amateurism basis alone). In the
past, courts did not question the NCAA restrictions, trusting the mere assertion of
competitive balance and amateurism as sufficient justifications. See id. (setting out
historical evolution of NCAA compensation policies).
33. See id. at 339–40 (describing recently growing changes in evolution of student-athlete claims against NCAA and courts beginning to hear and give credence
to such claims).
34. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 990 F.
Supp. 2d at 999 (setting forth plaintiffs’ claims against NCAA for nonconsensual
commercial use of their names and likenesses).
35. See id. at 1002–04 (describing NCAA’s role in market such that it exercises
control over licensing and use of student athletes’ names and likenesses, subjecting it to possible antitrust actions).
36. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 353 (discussing courts’ recent trend in approaching student claims against NCAA same way as other antitrust claims, giving
more weight to NCAA’s impact on students and economic market).
37. See id. at 350–51 (discussing courts’ permission of NCAA restrictions on
market distinction, which relies on premise that competitive balance and eligibility
concerns are sufficient to exclude it from antitrust violations).
38. See id. at 343 (noting that courts are no longer exclusively convinced by
NCAA’s justification that all of its restrictions have anticompetitive effects).
39. See id. (describing new standard that NCAA must show obvious or demonstrable pro-competitive effects in order to avoid antitrust challenges).
40. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
990 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (describing likeness licensing litigation);
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This Comment will critically analyze the NCAA’s announcement of the travel waiver with respect to its historical objectives and
challenges in enforcing its policies, specifically focusing compensation restrictions. Section II will discuss the history and development of the NCAA’s amateurism policies, which have driven its
compensation restrictions, and how the NCAA and courts have handled and justified the policies when challenged.41 Section II will
then assess the travel expense waiver as related to the Association’s
stated objectives. Section III will detail how antitrust claims factor
into the compensation restrictions, defining the college sports market and the role of NCAA regulations in antitrust challenges.42 Section IV will provide support for the legitimate goals of NCAA
regulation, detail the existing options and provide suggestions for
how to reconcile the NCAA’s important objectives with students’,
universities’ and the public’s exploitation concerns.43 Section V
will discuss the consequences that the travel waiver implicates, and
the potential consequences of lifting compensation restrictions.44
Finally, Section VI will summarize the travel waiver’s contribution to
existing complaints about student-athlete compensation and the future litigation and conflict it is likely to cause.45
II. BACKGROUND: THE SLOWLY ERODING BASIS
NCAA JUSTIFICATIONS

FOR

A. The Formation and Degradation of the NCAA’s
Amateurism Rules
Since the NCAA was founded, it has instituted restrictions on
member colleges paying student-athletes.46 The Association sets a
number of goals in support of these restrictions, some of which are
Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No.
2:00-CV-1439, 2002 WL 32137511 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2002) (describing antitrust
litigation); Corman v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 74 A.3d 1149 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2013) (discussing commerce clause implications).
41. See infra notes 46–94 and accompanying text (providing background for
NCAA policies and introducing student-athlete litigation).
42. See infra notes 95–142 and accompanying text (discussing influence of Antitrust law on NCAA compensation restrictions).
43. See infra notes 143–69 and accompanying text (describing justifications for
amateurism rules and suggesting alternatives to student compensation).
44. See infra notes 170–90 and accompanying text (discussing travel waiver’s
possible effects on college sports and compensation policies).
45. See infra notes 188–97 and accompanying text (describing travel waiver’s
current and future implications).
46. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 331, 334–36 (detailing history and formation of NCAA).
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contradicted by the travel expense waiver.47 These goals motivate
and justify compensation restrictions pertaining to recruitment,
likeness licensing or any other type of conduct the NCAA deems
inappropriate.48 The NCAA’s main goals are: to maintain competitive balance between amateur athletic teams, keep a clear line distinguishing professional and amateur sports, preserve the identity
and integrity of college sports, and to maintain a prominent media
audience for college sports.49 Over the years, courts deciding student-athlete compensation cases have taken these NCAA arguments
into account.50 Historically, the NCAA has generally been able to
convince the court of its legitimate purposes.51
More recently, courts have loosened the strict stance on certain
aspects of the compensation restrictions, putting the travel expense
waiver at risk for stirring up even more litigation.52 This has the
potential to stir up more litigation and weaken faith in the NCAA’s
justifications and purposes, ultimately risking the degradation of its
mission and platform.53 Such decisions require more of a showing
that the NCAA has substantial goals for restricting compensation,
without imposing unnecessary limits on the student-athlete mar-

47. See 20015–16 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15 at art. 12 (setting out rules for
amateurism and eligibility). The NCAA’s provision of any benefit, not limited to
monetary compensation, is strongly forbidden by the NCAA, which leaves no room
for discretion in providing benefits outside of already permissible conduct. See id.
at art.12.3.1.3
48. See id. at arts. 12.1.2, 19.5 (setting out specific anticompetitive violations
and conduct which NCAA deem to be violations and subject to sanction).
49. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 358–59 (discussing NCAA’s intentions in
creating and enforcing amateurism rules).
50. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (observing that preservation of college athletics warranted compensation restrictions); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d
1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing competitive balance objective); Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 2:00-CV-1439,
2002 WL 32137511 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2002) (recognizing pro-competitive
justifications).
51. See Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, 2002 WL 32137511, at *16–17
(holding that NCAA restrictions caused no identifiable harm on athletes or college
sports market).
52. See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955,
1008–09 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (prohibiting NCAA restrictions on allowing players compensation for certain likeness royalties), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049
(9th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1167 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2016).
53. See id. at 963 (holding that if NCAA fails convince court of its precompetitive justifications, court may impose permanent injunctions on NCAA compensation restrictions).
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ket.54 In addition, these decisions indicate a shift away from deferring to the NCAA in compensation challenges.55
B. Concern on All Fronts: Fallout From the Travel
Expenses Waiver
When the NCAA announced its travel expense waiver in January 2015, the media sprang to life with skepticism about what this
meant for the NCAA.56 Questions centered on the issues of eligibility rules and the general ban on financing athletes and their families.57 Even those who have favored student-athlete compensation
have questioned the Association’s motives.58 The waiver presents
two potential issues in enforcing the NCAA’s amateurism model:
the NCAA’s actual motivation in amateurism restrictions and the
likely resulting outpouring of litigation opened up by the allowance
of travel expenses.59
1. Compromise or Corruption: The NCAA’s Motivation
The first consideration in assessing the NCAA’s motivation for
the waiver is the recipients of the stipend, which are participants in
the Final Four Championship and the men’s Football Playoff.60
The announcement of the waiver came with statements about families sharing in the championship experience, but made no refer54. See id. at 979 (noting NCAA’s minimal showing of evidence of competitive
balance).
55. See Kastenberg & Pratt, supra note 19 (discussing legal implications and
risks NCAA and universities will face in light of recent court decisions).
56. See Jack Andrade, NCAA Changes Tune, Will Pay Travel Expenses for Families
of Athletes, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.boston.com/sports/untagged/
2015/01/07/ncaa-changes-tune-will-pay-travel-expenses-for-families-of-athletes
(discussing controversial nature of NCAA’s decision with public scrutiny ramifications). Critics argue that because the NCAA has not spoken to why the provision
of travel expenses was not allowed until now, there is little support for any compensation restrictions the NCAA maintains. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (noting lack of
foundation for compensation rules).
57. See Schwartz, supra note 14. (noting skepticism about NCAA waiver potentially violating its own rules).
58. See id. (noting that waiver raises questions about NCAA ineligibility rules
concerning student athlete compensation); see also Schwartz, supra note 14 (asserting that NCAA skates fine line between compensating students and compensating
their parents).
59. For a general discussion of the NCAA’s motivation, see infra notes 60–73
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the potential resulting litigation, see
infra notes 75–85 and accompanying text.
60. See NCAA to Pay for Family Travel Under Pilot Program, supra note 9 (announcing which families would be eligible for travel compensation).
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ence to other championships outside of these two sports.61 Because
the men’s basketball tournament is a hefty contributor to the
NCAA’s budget, this delegation raises suspicions.62 Critics have argued that in order to retain its reputation, the NCAA would have to
compensate families for travel to championship games of every
sport.63
Another consideration is the NCAA’s own prohibition on
transportation benefits, which has not been altered since the waiver
was announced.64 On its face, the prohibition declares the travel
expense waiver unethical.65 In enacting the waiver, the NCAA
showed no intention of modifying its by-laws to reflect the departure.66 The only way to begin reconciling the waiver with the NCAA
by-laws is to declare that the only two parties permitted to pay travel
expenses are the NCAA and its member colleges.67 However, the
NCAA did not make this delineation and has not answered many
inconsistency concerns.68
Third is the waiver’s conflict with its professed motives in enacting and maintaining compensation restrictions.69 Currently, student-athletes’ permission to use their names and likenesses is part
61. See id. (mentioning only basketball and men’s football post-season games
as eligible for family travel benefits). The NCAA, while acknowledging the importance of other Division I sporting events, has not spoken to why travel expenses will
not be extended to those events. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (noting discrepancies
in NCAA’s travel waiver and its previous decisions).
62. See Jonathon Berr, March Madness: Follow the Money, CBS MONEYWATCH
(Mar. 20, 2015, 5:45 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/march-madness-followthe-money/ (noting that men’s March Madness tournament is NCAA’s largest
source of revenue); see also Jake New, Forgetting Title IX, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 15,
2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/01/15/changes-ncaa-rulesraise-title-ix-concerns (asserting that NCAA’s source of money is no excuse for discriminating in giving benefit to college teams).
63. See id. (noting dissatisfaction at inequality of NCAA provision of travel
benefits).
64. See 2015–16 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, at art. 12.3.1.3 (deeming any
player ineligible if player or player’s relatives receives benefits, including transportation from any outside agent).
65. See id. at art. 10.1(c) (finding any provision of additional benefits to student athletes unethical violation of bylaws).
66. See NCAA to Pay for Family Travel Under Pilot Program, supra note 9 (indicating no reconciliation between bylaws and travel waiver, or any kind of loophole in
existing rules).
67. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (speculating that waiver implies only NCAA
and universities have authorization under waiver, while not explicitly forbidding
others from contributing).
68. See id. (expressing concern that waiver’s unspecified range of donors will
result in boosters, sponsors, and other interested parties’ provision of travel benefits, in direct violation of NCAA policy).
69. For a discussion of the NCAA’s goals in maintaining compensation rules,
see infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
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of the recruitment process, but with new lawsuits pushing the limits,
member institutions may also begin pushing back for permission to
use formerly restricted methods of recruitment.70 This would open
up to various legal issues involving universities trying to get around
the NCAA restrictions to compete in recruiting athletes.71 Allowing
schools to pay for families’ travel expenses attacks the balance between athletic teams.72 As a result, travel expenses have the potential to become another tool for schools as they attempt to recruit
players.73
2. NCAA Opens the Door to a Roomful of Litigation
Student-plaintiffs seeking compensation for their athletic performance have come at the NCAA from all sides.74 Most recently,
in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,75 college athletes brought an antitrust action against the NCAA concerning a
names and likenesses dispute.76 The student-athletes wanted a
share of revenues generated by the NCAA and member schools using the students’ names and likenesses in video games, telecasts,
and other media footage.77
In support of their demands, the plaintiffs alleged that the
NCAA rules restricting such revenue sharing violated antitrust
laws.78 In their allegations, the plaintiffs argued that because Divi70. See Kastenberg & Pratt, supra note 19 (discussing students’ and universities’ suggestions to provide stipends based on game attendance, and shares of licensing revenue to student-athletes).
71. See id. (describing unfettered disruption likely to result from undermining
NCAA objectives).
72. See id. (noting courts’ and NCAA’s concerns of commercial exploitation
of student-athletes).
73. See id. (discussing legal and anti-competitive issues implicated by loosening NCAA compensation restrictions). NCAA member universities currently use
academic scholarships and quality of athletic facilities to recruit players for their
programs. Loosening the restrictions would subject universities to increased variety and unbalanced inequality in recruiting, potentially disrupting the NCAA’s
competitive platform. See id. (noting NCAA foundational justification for pro-competitive philosophy).
74. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
990 F. Supp. 2d 996, 998–99 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (describing likeness licensing litigation); Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
No. 2:00-CV-1439, 2002 WL 32137511, at *3–4 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2002) (describing antitrust litigation); Corman v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 74 A.3d 1149,
1168–70 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (discussing commerce clause implications).
75. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d
1049 (9th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1167 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2016).
76. See id. at 962–63 (summarizing litigation).
77. See id. at 962 (setting out plaintiffs’ claims).
78. See id. at 963 (describing plaintiffs’ Sherman Act challenge).
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sion I teams are their only avenue to a professional career, studentathlete recruits have no option but to permit the universities and
the NCAA to use their names and likeness without compensation.79
Therefore, the students claimed, the NCAA’s refusal to allow compensation beyond scholarship awards restrains trade within the
market of college athletic institutions.80
While conceding that its regulations may restrain trade in the
college athletics market, the NCAA argued that the restraints were
not unlawful because they achieved “pro-competitive purposes.”81
Therefore, any hindrance on competition between colleges in
recruiting athletes is enforced in the interest of equal competition
among college teams.82 The district court, while acknowledging
that the NCAA may be justified in this goal, also voiced doubt in the
NCAA’s general stance and policy.83 The opinion stated that its
“other rules and practices suggest that the Association is unconcerned with achieving competitive balance.”84
C. Back to Basics: The Board of Regents Standard
An early challenge to the NCAA compensation rules came in
National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.85 The plaintiffs were NCAA member colleges who
felt that they lacked sufficient influence in the NCAA’s regulation
decisions.86 The plaintiffs asserted that the NCAA’s television program restriction, which limited the number of college games broad79. See id. at 966 (laying out allegations in support of plaintiffs’ antitrust
claims).
80. See id. at 966–67, 971–73 (summarizing evidence regarding college education and athletic “market”, and asserted restraints of trade).
81. See id. at 973. (describing NCAA’s pro-competitive purposes as: promoting
integration of athletics and academics, maintaining competitive balance, and increasing output of college sports product).
82. See id. (describing NCAA claims that education is at center of any compensation decision, and amateurism tradition is best preserved by restricting
compensation).
83. See id. at 975–76 (finding amateurism to be solid justification for NCAA’s
compensation restrictions, but finding that NCAA had not effectively substantiated
its claims and had been too inconsistent in its enforcement).
84. Id. at 978. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district
court’s decision that the NCAA regulations violated antitrust laws, but reversed the
injunction requiring schools to pay athletes name and likeness royalties, reasoning
that paying the student-athletes would “vitiate their amateur status as collegiate
athletes.” O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049,1077 (9th Cir.
2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1167 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2016).
85. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
86. See id. at 94 (noting member universities’ dissatisfaction with NCAA sanction policies).
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cast, was a restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.87 The
NCAA defended that the plan was necessary to ensure live attendance at college football games, which is instrumental in maintaining the integrity of the sport.88
The Supreme Court held that in order to preserve the quality
of college athletics, students must not be paid.89 The Court stated
that this was appropriate in light of the NCAA’s need to maximize
consumer demand for amateur athletics.90 The Court also stated
that the market needed to be preserved and that the NCAA’s regulations were an effective way of protecting the amateur competition
in light of the nature of college sports.91 This decision represents
the hard line once drawn by the NCAA in its goal to maintain amateurism and pro-competitive balance.92 The Court also held that
87. See id. at 85 (describing plaintiff’s claims against NCAA).
88. See id. at 116 (describing NCAA’s defense based on protecting and insulating live ticket sales).
89. See id. at 100–02 (stating NCAA’s goals in maintaining compensation restrictions and agreeing with NCAA that they promote integrity of education
received).
90. See id. at 101 (recognizing that without restraints, market for college athletics would be unavailable). Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens
described:
[T]he NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—college football. The identification of this “product” with an academic tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than
professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as,
for example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character
and quality of the “product,” athletes must not be paid, must be required
to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the “product” cannot be
preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field
might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling
college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product
to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this
role, its actions widen consumer choice—not only the choices available to
sports fans but also those available to athletes—and hence can be viewed
as precompetitive.
Id. at 101–02 (footnote omitted).
91. See id. at 117 (agreeing with NCAA that regulations served legitimate and
important goals). The Court explained:
Our decision not to apply a per se rule to this case rests in large part on
our recognition that a certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the
type of competition that [the NCAA] and its member institutions seek to
market is to be preserved. It is reasonable to assume that most of the
regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore precompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics.
Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
92. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 338 (citing Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at
100–02) (noting that Board of Regents reinforced NCAA principle that competitive
balance idea is “legitimate and important”).
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the restraints were essential to the marketing, popularity, and identity of college sports.93 During the next two decades, courts steadfastly held to the stance taken by the Board of Regents Court.94
III. WHY ANTITRUST LAWS SHOULD THWART POTENTIAL LITIGANTS
A. Defining Commercial Entities
Those opposed to the NCAA’s regulations have claimed that
the restrictions violate the Sherman Act by limiting the market created by student-athletes’ services and the use of their likenesses in
the media.95 The Sherman Act prohibits activities in restraint of
trade or commerce; in other words, activities that have anti-competitive effects.96 Because the statute is targeted at businesses and their
particular markets, courts have held that it is not directly applicable
to the student-athlete context.97 Furthermore, in 2004 one federal
court found that not only were the antitrust laws inapplicable to
NCAA restrictions, but that the rules were not commercial.98 In
doing so, the court used the standard of whether the rules were
commercial considering the surrounding circumstances.99
93. See id. at 338–40 (discussing significance of Court’s decision in Board of
Regents, and vital role NCAA restraints have in enabling college sports market to
prosper); see also Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–02 (supporting justifications in
support of NCAA’s restraints on trade).
94. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 339 (stating that Board of Regents “laid a
strong foundation for subsequent arguments that the antitrust laws should not invalidate restraints on competition for the services of NCAA student-athletes,” and
“lower federal courts seized the opportunity to treat NCAA player restraints in a
significantly different manner from other NCAA regulations”).
95. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 344 (discussing antitrust principles as related to NCAA restrictions, and legal implications).
96. See, e.g., Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Nat’l Hockey League Players’
Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d 712 (6th Cit. 2003)) (explaining
that agreement may unreasonably restrain trade in violation of Sherman Act where
it “produces significant anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and geographic markets”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (prohibiting unlawful restraints of
trade in interstate commerce).
97. See, e.g., Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D.
Mass. 1975) (holding that student athlete could not be deemed “competitor” in
context of antitrust laws).
98. See Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (treating NCAA restrictions as
aiming to promote education and amateurism, and therefore immune to antitrust
challenge).
99. See id. at 581 (stating that nature of conduct must be commercial in order
to fit under antitrust analysis).
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For the Sherman act to apply, not only must an entity be commercial, but the rule itself must also be commercial.100 Additionally, commercial entities can be immune to antitrust challenges if a
legitimate purpose exists for their regulation.101 The NCAA takes a
paternalistic role in promoting legitimate goals, and therefore, its
compensation regulations have not been held to warrant a Sherman Act challenge.102 In a sense, the NCAA has been exempted
from susceptibility to the market in the context of these claims.103
1. Actual Economic Injury
Antitrust law actually protects the competition itself, not the
economic injury to the individual.104 When there is actual economic injury caused by restraints on the market, it must be direct
and substantial.105 Students challenging the NCAA rules and seeking to prove actual injury must prove that the regulations have
caused some other adverse effect.106 More recently, the standard
developed by the courts has been to reluctantly hold the NCAA to
antitrust standards unless anticompetitive impact can be offset by
benefits to the market.107
2. Relationship Between the Media, the NCAA, the College and the
Athlete
A popular criticism of the NCAA’s strict regulations is the idea
that the Association and its member schools make so much money
from their athletes’ performance that it is unjust for any share of
100. See Valley Prods. Co. v. Landmark, 128 F.3d 398, 402–03, 405–06 (6th
Cir. 1997) (noting accepted premise that actual competition in relevant market
must exist in antitrust litigation).
101. See Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743–45
(M.D. Tenn. 1990) (concluding that NCAA regulation need not be examined
under antitrust laws because its overriding purpose was essential to maintaining
important education standards).
102. See Pocono Invitational, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 584–85 (discussing NCAA’s legitimate and necessary purpose in promoting compensation rules).
103. See id. at 585 (finding NCAA compensation restrictions not to be facially
anticompetitive).
104. See Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962) (deciding that regulated competitive market must be generally recognized by public).
105. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 529 (1983) (setting forth standard for economic injury
in application to antitrust principles).
106. See id. at 537 (interpreting statutory language to mean that judicial remedy in cases must remedy broader issues outside of specific antitrust plaintiff’s
claims).
107. See, e.g., Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th
Cir. 1998) (adopting standard when anticompetitive effects appear so obvious so as
to warrant additional examination).
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this revenue to be withheld from the athletes.108 Proponents believe that athletes are the most important part of the revenue process but are unfairly cut out of being paid for their athletic
performance.109 Contrary to this view, athletic programs do not actually receive the amount of money that the media promulgates.110
In fact, it is not uncommon for teams in the NCAA tournament to
lose money.111 Division I programs generate hefty expenses in order to enhance the academic and athletic environment they can
provide for their athletes.112
In addition, while schools may report portions of their budget
as coming from television, they are usually unclear where their revenue actually comes from, and donors or sponsors are often the
main source.113 Television companies are the beneficiaries of tournament broadcasting and high-priced ticket sales.114 While some
teams may bring in more than others depending on how they
choose to allocate funds, the only entities receiving substantially
large profits from televising college sporting events are the broadcasting companies themselves.115 In addition, teams that have created their own broadcasting networks must also devote significant
use of this medium to promote their academic programs, and with
more sports networks being developed each year, colleges will have
to allocate funds to combat conflicting messages.116
108. See Wong et al., supra note 2, at 18–20 (discussing public’s approach in
support of lifting NCAA restrictions).
109. See id. at 18 (noting pro-compensation view of imbalanced relationship
between Division I schools and their athletes). The litigation focused on granting
students more rights in receiving revenue for their performance threatens the fundamental nature of the NCAA’s anti-compensation policies. See id. at 22 (describing student-plaintiff litigation raised in response to outrage at lack of student
rights in revenue generated by college athletic programs).
110. See, e.g., Darren Rovell, Many Tourney Teams Don’t Turn Profit, ESPN (Mar.
16, 2015), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/tournament/2015/story/
_/id/12495302/many-ncaa-tournament-teams-did-not-turn-profit (listing several
teams whose programs did not profit in 2015 NCAA basketball tournament).
111. See id. (describing money primarily allocated to student accommodation
and coach salaries, at times withholding profit from athletic program).
112. See id. (describing money spent on high quality tutors, hotel accommodations for away games, and best coaches available).
113. See id. (noting athletic directors’ statements that reported numbers,
while accurate, do not always clearly represent status of program or sources of
funds).
114. See id. (discussing major profit gained by television broadcasting companies and revenues received from NCAA teams themselves).
115. See id. (recognizing discrepancies in Division I teams’ revenues, while no
team’s earnings from televising events rival those of networks and broadcasting
companies).
116. See Transcript of A Network of Their Own, ON THE MEDIA (Feb. 5, 2010),
available at http://www.onthemedia.org/story/132664-a-network-of-their-own/
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3. Where is the Market?
In order to subject the NCAA rules to antitrust laws, there must
be an existing relevant market and anti-competitive effects existing
within the market.117 The Supreme Court has held that antitrust
plaintiffs must prove that the defendant has caused damage by
reaching into the specified commercial market.118 In order to conclude that a rule is commercial, it must be determined that the entity promulgating the rule is commercial.119
When an entity that would normally be held to the commercial
antitrust standard engages in conduct that actually enhances its
market, neither the market nor the entity will be viewed as relevant
for antitrust market analysis. Courts have found that the market
served by the NCAA is not deemed to be a relevant commercial
market under the existing standard.120 Because restraints on competition are necessary for the college sports industry to maintain its
“product” (competition between teams), NCAA regulation that imposes such restraints cannot themselves be treated as violations of
the Act.121
B. Questioning the Inadequacy of the Current Compensation
Benefits
With the travel expenses waiver comes the inquiry into the
compensation student-athletes already receive, and why it is not
transcript/ (describing economic consequences of increase in individual and regional sports team networks).
117. See Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, No. 2:00-CV-1439, 2002 WL 32137511, at 6 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2002) (citing
Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019–20 (10th Cir. 1998))
(discussing standard for evaluating whether market exists for purposes of antitrust
analysis).
118. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)
(holding that violation must substantially hinder actual commercial market).
119. See Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, 2002 WL 32137511, at 14 (describing plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that defendant has power and control within
defined market). In Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association, the court gave credence to the holding in Board of Regents,
where the Supreme Court held that the NCAA was exempt from the traditional
market analysis because its restraints were essential for the college sports industry
to continue. See Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, 2002 WL 32137511, at 5 (citing
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
101 (1984)).
120. See id. at 6–7 (deciding that although NCAA regulation may have some
commercial impact, it did not fit relevant scheme for designation as market, and
anti-competitive effects on particular market could not be identified).
121. See Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016–18, 1024
(10th Cir. 1998) (requiring that different standard be used to assess NCAA regulation under Sherman Act).
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enough.122 While some feel that student-athletes deserve compensation in exchange for their athletic participation, others believe it
would be unfair to non-athlete students.123 Universities offer athletes scholarship tuition to recruit athletes to their programs, which
is perceived as a type of compensation.124 Furthermore, students
are not employees, and paying them for their performance would
create an employee-employer relationship and all of the expectations and demands that follow.125 Student-athletes receive benefits
from their performance that have nothing to do with being paid,
and compensation would negate many of these benefits.126
Student-athletes also receive benefits such as the exclusive use
of state-of-the-art athletic facilities, private tutoring and money towards textbooks.127 The NCAA by-laws are clear about financial
benefit to athletes not exceeding money for education.128 Considering the NCAA’s existing regulations concerning student pay, the
introduction of the travel expense waiver blurs the line that distinguishes payment from nonpayment.129
The NCAA defines payment as “the receipt of funds, awards or
benefits not permitted by the government legislation of the Association for participation in athletics.”130 By its own definition, the
NCAA considers payment as whatever the NCAA wishes to regulate.131 The loophole that the Association created will not fare well
122. See Lot Tan, Scholarships Sufficient Compensation for Student-Athletes, Some
Say, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.daytondailynews.
com/news/news/scholarships-sufficient-compensation-for-student-a/nfMgk/ (introducing debate over whether students currently receive enough benefit).
123. See id. (noting that unlike many other students, even scholarship athletes
who do not make the professional draft graduate without debt).
124. See id. (describing argument that scholarships are compensation enough
and that student athletes should not be paid).
125. See id. (describing NCAA’s exclamation that students are not employees
and cannot be expected to sacrifice studies for athletic performance).
126. See id. (describing how regimented and rigorous life of paid student athlete would be).
127. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 360–61 (listing ways in which students already receive compensation in exchange for athletic performance).
128. See 2015–16 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 15, art. 16.11.2 (defining any extra benefit as unethical and outside of NCAA’s permitted conduct).
129. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (asserting that travel expense waiver directly
undercuts NCAA bylaws prohibiting provision of “transportation or other benefits”
for athletes, their relatives, or friends).
130. 20015–16 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 47, art. 12.02.08 (defining payment
for purposes of NCAA legislation).
131. See NCAA Paying for Parents to Get to Final Four, But Will This Pilot Program
Become Permanent?, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 1 2015, 11:54 AM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/sports/college/ncaa-paying-parents-final-indianapolis-article-1.2169548
(discussing inconsistencies in NCAA promulgation of rules and bylaws).
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in future suits with courts seeking more substantial justification.132
Indeed, the O’Bannon decision demonstrates that courts are already
dissatisfied with the amateurism goals the NCAA promulgates.133
The NCAA declared that in the case of the travel waiver, its focus
was family.134 However, a major concern stems from the fact that
the NCAA maintains a strong focus and emphasis on the integrity
of amateurism in its goals.135
The NCAA currently still requires any student-athlete or recruit to be certified as an amateur athlete before being considered
to play.136 In declaring a new goal while refusing to budge on its
existing ones, the Association essentially places a Band-Aid on a bullet hole.137 The NCAA’s waiver and its justifications offer no explanation for whether it will soon be permissible for other parties, such
as boosters, or sponsors, to pay for travel expenses as well.138 If this
were to be the case, new practical and legal issues would arise, and
open the door to lawsuits no longer just regarding antitrust violation but the degradation of the college sports industry as it currently exists.139
In O’Bannon, where the district court ruled against the NCAA
restrictions on likeness revenue sharing, the NCAA was still able to
convince the court that certain restrictions on compensation to student-athletes are warranted to protect competitive balance, and the
132. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (declaring absence of bedrock foundational
principle to support travel expense waiver). NCAA by-laws state, “Pay is the receipt
of funds, awards or benefits not permitted by the governing legislation of the Association for participation in athletics.” 2015–16 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 47, art.
12.02.9 (defining pay as NCAA decides).
133. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d
955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding NCAA’s sweeping prohibition on compensation insufficient without further justification), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049
(9th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1167 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2016).
134. See NCAA to Pay for Family Travel Under Pilot Program, supra note 9 (quoting NCAA president as stating that families should have benefit of celebrating victories with student-athletes).
135. See Amateurism, supra note 6 (asserting quality of education as top priority
and that athletes are “students first, athletes second”).
136. See id. (instructing any potential student athlete to become certified as
amateur before consideration).
137. See NCAA Paying for Parents to Get to Final Four, But Will This Pilot Program
Become Permanent?, supra note 131 (noting existing and future complications in delegating reimbursement funds).
138. See id. (drawing attention to discrepancies between existing NCAA
prohibitions and travel waiver).
139. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (raising concerns about implications of allowing certain types of benefits); Tan, supra note 122 (describing possible consequence that student-athlete selection would be completely irrelevant of academic
performance in high school).
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court of appeals ultimately agreed.140 This small victory illustrates
that both the Association and the courts are still holding steadfastly
to the NCAA’s code as it stands.141 Loosening compensation restrictions also presents the issue of students as employees, creating a
pay-for-play, or rather a pay-to-win system.142
IV. PROTECTING

THE

INTEGRITY

OF

COLLEGE SPORTS

NCAA compensation restrictions function to prevent players
from being manipulated by their university.143 Student-athletes
need to be protected as players who not only devote their time to
their team, but also to pursuing academic goals which are equally, if
not more, important at this stage.144 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has recognized these goals to be necessary for preserving
fair and honest competition among amateur college students.145
That court, in Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,146
found the NCAA’s requirements for member colleges to require
minimum credit and GPA requirements to be in direct furtherance
of academic goals and found in favor of the NCAA.147 The court
also found favor with the NCAA’s restraints as pro-competitive and
necessary to the college sports market.148 The court further held
140. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999–1000 (holding that some restrictions
on compensation have valid precompetitive results); see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049,1074 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding “concrete
procompetitive effect in NCAA’s commitment to amateurism”), petition for cert.
filed, No. 15-1167 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2016).
141. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 346–48 (noting courts’ reluctance to rule
against NCAA justifications unless absolutely no showing of precompetitive justification has been proffered).
142. See Will Leitch, Can College Sports Survive Collective Bargaining?, NEW YORK
MAGAZINE (Apr. 20, 2014, 9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/
04/leitch-can-college-sports-survive-unions.html (noting that compensation would
require restructuring NCAA structure to accommodate student-employee model).
143. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 329 (noting importance of keeping college
sports separate from professional).
144. See id. at 349 (discussing need to protect integrity of college sports
model).
145. See Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992)
(supporting NCAA restrictions for benefits to academic focus on student-athletes’
careers).
146. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
147. See id. at 1088 (recognizing restrictions as integral to educational and
academic experience unique to Division I athletics).
148. See id. at 1089 (finding that NCAA did not have goal of commercial advantage or exploitation, but of preserving public interest in college sports).
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that the rules promoted fair competition, encouraged educational
success and prevented commercialism.149
A. Enhancing the Public Integrity and Interest
College sports are marketed differently and have a different
audience than professional sports.150 NCAA regulations are important to this distinction because they enhance public interest in the
college sports industry.151 College athletes are simultaneously pursuing degrees that will prepare them to enter the employment market.152 Because their sole purpose is not to be athletes, they appeal
to a different market than professional sports.153 This factor serves
as justification for the NCAA to maintain restrictions that hold a
clear line between college and professional sports.154 The NCAA
regulations help to facilitate this distinction because the regulations
are uniform across all member colleges.155 Therefore, no school
has a competitive advantage over another in marketing to the
public.156
B. Existing Options
NCAA member schools compete to recruit the best athletes by
offering services in exchange for athletic performance.157 With this
exchange comes the understanding, which the NCAA and the
courts have adhered to, that receiving improper compensation can
lead to loss of eligibility.158 The NCAA has the authority to regulate
149. See id. at 1090–91 (holding that NCAA restriction serves to establish distinction between professional and amateur sports, further academic priorities, and
prevent labor market for college athletes).
150. See The Largest, Most Attractive Fan Base in Sports, supra note 2 (discussing
difference in fan base between amateur and professional sports).
151. See Amateurism, supra note 6 (describing NCAA’s role and mission in promoting the public’s interest for college sports).
152. See Banks, 977 F.2d at 1090 (asserting that college athletes are preparing
to enter market for non-athletic occupations).
153. See id. (stating that NCAA restrictions are legitimate way to protect college academics from being overshadowed by profit objectives). In Banks, the
Court decided that the NCAA did not violate antitrust laws when it withdrew student’s eligibility after he participated in professional draft. See id.
154. See id. (finding NCAA restrictions necessary to prevent athletes from focusing on professional prospects instead of academic pursuits).
155. See id. (acknowledging NCAA’s minimum requirements for student-athletes pertaining to all member schools).
156. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 35–37 (discussing NCAA goal of equality
among NCAA member institutions).
157. See id. at 344 (discussing interaction between NCAA, universities, and
athletes in recruiting process).
158. See id. at 334–36 (providing example of sanctions held to be appropriate
in light of NCAA goals and regulations).
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and set standards for what schools are permitted to offer during
recruitment.159 When recruits enter this exchange, they agree to
be responsible for any costs of participating in the program not covered by their scholarship.160 In assuming these costs, student-athletes subject themselves to the NCAA’s and their institution’s rules
in order to remain eligible to play while furthering both their academic and athletic careers.161 The travel expense waiver apparently
declares one such cost, travel expenses for families, exempt from
this consideration.162 With the announcement of the waiver, the
NCAA also mentioned its recent steps to provide more benefits that
sidestep the no-compensation rules.163
The goal for many recruits is to eventually play professionally.164 During recruitment, high school athletes who have an interest in playing professionally know that the way to get there is by
playing for a Division I team.165 For these students, their university
is aiding them in gaining public notoriety, and in turn, helping
them in their pursuit of playing professionally.166 If it were not for
this platform, student-athletes would have no framework for attempting to seek revenue from the use of their likeness.167 Despite
these athletes’ vehement protests that this type of litigation is their
159. See id. at 331–32 (describing standardization principles behind NCAA
enforcement policies).
160. See Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D.
Mass. 1975) (holding that student athletes contract to be students of their universities, and not professional athletes in a business context).
161. See id. at 303 (noting that students are not market competitors, and
therefore, the NCAA is not governed by antitrust laws).
162. See NCAA to Pay for Family Travel Under Pilot Program, supra note 9 (setting
out guidelines for implementation of travel expense waiver).
163. See id. (mentioning NCAA’s continued efforts toward improving travel
experience for students and families).
164. See Probability of Competing in Sports Beyond High School, NCAA, http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/probability-competing-beyond-highschool (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (comparing most college athletes’ intentions of
being professionally drafted during academic career to actual percentage of
drafted athletes).
165. See Estimated Probability of Competing in College Athletics, NCAA, http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-college
-athletics (last visited Apr. 17, 2016) (describing NCAA Division I program participation as primary source for professional draft). In fact, participation in Division I
teams is almost exclusively the only way for an athlete to reach a professional career. See Tan, supra note 122 (recognizing general acceptance of professional
teams drafting solely from Division I programs).
166. See Rovell, supra note 110 (indicating that NCAA teams regularly allocate
funds to media publicity).
167. See Wong et al., supra note 2, at 53–54 (explaining fans’ devotion and
loyalty to college athletes, largely due to respect for hard-working students, which
contributes to sales of college team apparel and merchandise).
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only mechanism for seeking adequate payment for the money they
bring in, the majority of the public, including coaches and players,
oppose compensation, believing that scholarships and the advantages of being a student-athlete are sufficient opportunities.168
Such lawsuits demonstrate these student-athletes’ are attempting to
bite the hands that feed them.169
V. CONSEQUENCES

OF

PAYING STUDENT-ATHLETES

A. The College Athlete Dynamic
Concerns about paying student-athletes center around an idea
similar to the NCAA’s purported justification for its restrictions:
protecting the academic integrity of the student-athlete.170 Proponents of compensation for student-athletes are concerned that the
NCAA, instead of being focused on academic success, simply endeavors to exploit athletes and their universities for profit.171
These criticisms turn on the greed of the NCAA and the detrimental effects of industry on student-athletes.172
Ironically, the proposed solution to this argument would only
aggravate the problem.173 Continuing to open more avenues for
student-athletes to be paid is a slippery slope towards an employeremployee relationship, and the exploitation of the student-ath168. See Alex Prewitt, Large Majority Opposes Paying NCAA Athletes, Washington
Post-ABC News Poll Finds, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2014), https://www.washington
post.com/sports/colleges/large-majority-opposes-paying-ncaa-athletes-washingtonpost-abc-news-poll-finds/2014/03/22/c411a32e-b130-11e3-95e8-39bef8e9a48b_
story.html (reporting general public opinion poll results). University of Maryland
Athletic Director Kevin Anderson also commented, “You have an opportunity. If
you don’t want to be a student-athlete, you can say no and not go to school.” Id.
169. See Rovell, supra note 110 (describing sacrifices Division I programs make
to ensure their players receive quality benefits, even when it means cutting into
profit, and general public’s misconceptions about special treatment players
receive).
170. See, e.g., Amateurism, supra note 6 (highlighting education as NCAA’s top
priority); Jonathon Chait, Fixing College Sports: Why Paying Student Athletes Won’t
Work, NEW YORK MAGAZINE (Nov. 29, 2011, 12:36 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/
sports/2011/11/chait-why-paying-student-athletes-wont-work.html (noting quality
of college education as major concern in student-athlete compensation debate).
171. See, e.g., Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, Oct.
2011, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/theshame-of-college-sports/308643/?single_page=true (asserting that Division I
schools have no choice but to accept money from NCAA despite unfair revenuesharing).
172. See id. (noting that universities are powerless to corporations that offer
money for student athletes’ performance, and thus corruption is only kept at bay
by NCAA anti-compensation policies).
173. See Chait, supra note 170 (arguing that compensating student-athletes
would subject them to market forces, cutting against goal to protect them).
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lete.174 Were performance to be rewarded with compensation, the
incentive for athletes to demand money based on individual and
team successes would strain the quality of athletic programs, and
might even result in cutting women’s and non Division I teams, creating not only outrage but also discrimination claims.175 The delegation of pay to student-athletes, like the decision to reimburse
travel expenses for some families over others, would naturally lead
to compensation directly based on the profit the players bring into
the university.176
The introduction of compensation would also raise the issue of
athletes being paid in relation to the size of their fan base.177 This
would ultimately degrade any college athlete’s chance of receiving a
quality education, which is what athletic scholarships are intended
for.178 The travel expense waiver raises an issue already present
within the student compensation debate: whether performance or
need-based, which athletes (and their families) should get paid?179
B. Alternatives to Pay-For-Play
Ideas for alternatives to student compensation have been
raised by way of reform within the NCAA and within the universities
themselves.180 Schools have a better chance of instituting changes
than reform of the NCAA.181 A possible reform, which would rec174. See Nick Desai, Colleges Should Be About Education First, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 11, 2014, 6:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nick-desai/collegesshould-be-about_b_5669998.html (arguing that outcome-based compensation creates divide between students and athletes, placing higher value on athletes). This
approach also overlooks the fact that the students not being considered for compensation are those whose academic pursuits are the primary goal of the academic
institution. See id. (asserting college sports’ value as supplementing academic morale and engagement).
175. See Chait, supra note 170 (explaining compensation’s likely implications
for decreased work ethic in compensated and uncompensated athletes).
176. See Joe Nocera, The Institutional Pass, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/11/12/opinion/nocera-the-institutional-pass.html?_r=0
(explaining risks of subjecting student-athletes to profit-based treatment).
177. See Chait, supra note 170 (discussing issues likely to arise when paying
student-athletes based on factors such as performance, revenue, and
spectatorship).
178. See id. (noting that for most college athletes, education is more valuable
than playing time, and those few who go pro view education as fallback option).
179. See id. (discussing discrimination issues raised by allowing schools to
compensate student-athletes).
180. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 362 (suggesting such NCAA reform as
amending or eliminating certain restraints involved in antitrust disputes).
181. See id. at 365 (explaining universities’ options in likely case that NCAA
does not reform nor provide further justification for its compensation
restrictions).
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oncile the travel expense waiver, would be to revert to the thirtyyear old rule which did not allow freshman to play on their college
team, allowing them to focus on academics for the first and most
transitional year of college.182 In this scenario, while travel expenses still raise a serious pay-to-win issue, the freshman year rule
may strike a balance by putting academics first before any issue of
compensation arises.183 Most importantly this alternative would
preserve the foundational goal of preparing student-athletes as contributors to society.184
Another suggestion is to guarantee every athlete free tuition as
long as no rules are violated.185 Other alternatives focus on a stipend for student-athletes held in trust until the student graduates.186 For the travel expenses waiver to stand alone without
conflicting with the NCAA’s mission, the NCAA still must declare a
line denoting what kind of compensation is prohibited, or else prepare for a continuous onslaught of criticism and resulting
litigation.187
VI. CONCLUSION
The travel expense waiver is another controversial diversion
from the NCAA’s self-determined boundaries, which confuses the
basis for prohibiting student-athlete compensation.188 The waiver
conveniently allows the NCAA to conduct business as it pleases with182. See Kay Hawes, Debate on Amateurism Has Evolved Over Time, NCAA NEWS
ARCHIVE (Jan. 3, 2000, 4:07 PM), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/
2000/association-wide/debate%2Bon%2Bamateurism%2Bhas%2Bevolved%2B
over%2Btime%2B-%2B1-3-00.html (setting out historical timeline of NCAA amateurism rules); see also Chait, supra note 170 (describing benefit to be derived from
further demonstrating appropriate priorities and decreasing likelihood of graduating without solid education).
183. See Chait, supra note 170 (discussing issue of some college freshmen becoming famous before setting foot in the classroom, opening door for multitude
of compensation issues).
184. See Nocera, supra note 176 (emphasizing universities’ true educational
purpose).
185. See Ken Reed, Solution Regarding Paying College Athletes or Not is Simple,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ken-reed/so
lution-regarding-paying_b_8556872.html (proposing salary format as option for
student athlete compensation).
186. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 367 (suggesting stipend as compromise for
NCAA in light of many college athletes’ disadvantaged backgrounds).
187. See Kastenburg & Pratt, supra note 19 (noting courts’ hesitance to allow
student-athletes too many options for procuring compensation and NCAA’s opportunity to appeal current standing decisions against it).
188. See Schwartz, supra note 14 (describing NCAA’s ironic departure from
amateurism goal to purport family as overriding consideration in enacting travel
waiver).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol23/iss2/5

24

Holzhauer: To Educate or to Make a Profit: Compensating College Athletes' Fa

2016]

TO EDUCATE

OR TO

MAKE

A

PROFIT

533

out lifting restrictions as they pertain to outside parties.189 This inconsistency and failure to cover all bases incentivizes other parties
to cut corners as well.190 Member schools and athletes are already
finding ways to maneuver around the NCAA restrictions.191 The
waiver for travel expenses only fuels the fire and continues to perpetuate this cycle.192 The NCAA’s lackluster justifications have not
gone unnoticed, by the public or the courts.193 Opening up more
avenues for compensation only increases the likelihood of more
challenges to the NCAA regulations.194 The more litigation that
aims to invalidate the NCAA’s goals, the less effective the Association will be at regulating college athletics.195
The NCAA purports to strive for maintaining a competitive balance between college teams and preserving the integrity of college
athletics, and undercutting these missions degrades the public interest and respect, and therefore, the market of the industry.196
Travel expenses for families of students who make it to the Final
Four and Championship games makes the compensation depen-

189. See id. (noting inconsistency in NCAA’s purported goals in prohibiting
compensation and travel expense waiver’s allowance of extra benefits).
190. See Chait, supra note 170 (questioning what is to prevent public or private parties from petitioning NCAA or member institutions to allow donation in
light of NCAA’s stated goal of family incorporation in enacting travel waiver).
191. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.,
990 F. Supp. 2d 996 (describing likeness licensing litigation); Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 2:00-CV-1439, 2002
WL 32137511 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2002) (describing antitrust litigation); Corman v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 74 A.3d 1149 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) (discussing
Commerce Clause implications); Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d
1010 (10th Cir. 1998) (describing litigation concerning unreasonable restraint of
trade); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (describing antirust and trade litigation), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802
F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-1167 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2016); see
also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (describing
blanket license arrangement dispute).
192. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 14 (highlighting NCAA’s history of inconsistency in justifying its regulations).
193. See id. (describing public complaints from coaches, university athletic
programs about NCAA’s absolute compensation restrictions).
194. See id. (discussing endless cycle of questions and issues raised by NCAA
continuing to rule against its own principles).
195. See Kastenburg & Pratt, supra note 19 (noting that judicial decisions are
trending in direction of establishing more bases for student-athlete suits seeking
compensation).
196. See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 330 (describing constant challenges to
NCAA’s authority); see also Schwartz, supra note 14 (noting lack of respect for
NCAA policies without basis of supported and accepted foundational principles).
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dent on athletic performance, in turn violating all that is sacred
about college sports.197
Sarah L. Holzhauer*
197. See New, supra note 62 (noting further inequalities created by giving
some, but not all, athletes various forms of compensation); see also Chait, supra
note 170 (asserting that provision of quality education is most important goal in
college athletics, and is in danger of being tainted by monetary compensation).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.S., Psychology, Drexel University, cum laude, 2013.
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